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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate and to discuss on the basis of an in-
depth case study the range and limitations of public policy aiming at promoting the 
development of regional innovation networks and clusters. This is done first by 
denominating main criteria, potentials and problems of a public policy promoting 
regional clusters (section 1), second by describing the development of the network 
association InnoPlanta and its major framework conditions (sections 2 and 3), 
third by summarizing the actor constellation of the network and the innovation 
pattern and market perspectives of InnoPlanta's research projects (sections 4 and 
5), fourth by then pointing out the structure and role of public promotion policy in 
this process (section 6), fifth by comparing promotion objectives with results 
achieved (section 7), and sixth by drawing some conclusions concerning successful 
promotion policy in the case investigated and in general (section 8). 
As shown in the case study, the role, success or failure of public policy promoting 
the development of regional innovation networks and clusters depend on its fa-
vourable interaction dynamics with the existing social and economic contextual 
conditions. Therefore, referring to the in-depth case study of Conrad (2005), on the 
one hand these framework conditions are sketched in somewhat more detail, and 
on the other hand the article does not focus on one specific theoretical question, 
but tries to combine various analytical perspectives to explain the role and success 
of public promotion policy in the case of InnoPlanta. Consequently, this article 
concentrates on explaining the role of the BMBF InnoRegio program, in particular, 
for the development of the regional innovation network InnoPlanta, and not on 
this type of public promotion policy per se. 
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1 Introduction: promoting re-
gional clusters 
Addressing in general terms main cri-
teria, potentials and problems of a 
public promotion policy striving for the 
creation of innovative regional clus-
ters, first the respective key terms are 
specified in more detail. 
According to Meyer-Krahmer (1999: 
43), technology and innovation policy1 
aims at 
• the formation and shaping of the 
research landscape of a country, 
• the generation of favourable finan-
cial and other framework condi-
tions for basic research, long-term 
application-oriented research and 
industrial research, 
• the building and shaping of an in-
novation-oriented infrastructure, 
• and the conscious and sometimes 
unconscious influencing of tech-
nology development towards cer-
tain goals (competitiveness, living 
circumstances, infrastructure, long-
term programs). 
Instead of steering technology devel-
opment, it is actually rather caused by 
it due to systematic reasons. Since it 
cannot directly steer research and de-
velopment processes at a substantive 
level, it addresses research institu-
tions, i.e. formal organisations and not 
research activities themselves (cf. 
Daele 1989, Schimank 1991). 
Innovation networks may be conceived 
of as inter-organisational social sys-
tems which achieve technological and 
organisational formation of (their) 
structure by positive self-reinforcing 
feedback mechanisms, and they are 
necessarily cognitive networks which 
aim at the solution of a task and not 
just at balancing and coordinating 
                                                       
1 Innovation policy can be seen as the inte-
gral of science, education, research, tech-
nology and public policy (initiatives) ori-
ented towards industrial modernisation in 
order to improve the competitiveness of a 
(national) economy or of selected sectors. 
their interests. Regional innovation 
networks denote networks concen-
trated in one region with the primary 
aim and task – according to their own 
reasoning – to produce innovations by 
utilizing regional competencies and 
communication. 
Cluster presuppose the existence of 
regional networks (at least in a wider 
sense), but may well be limited to sec-
tor-related actors and arrangements of 
a region. Particularly, in newly emerg-
ing markets a local sector-specific 
cluster develops if the critical mass is 
transcended in a region resulting from 
sector-specific company agglomera-
tion in a region and sufficient local 
circumstances. Typically few key per-
sons coordinating different activities in 
the region play an important role. 
Cluster formation depends on the in-
terplay of appropriate sector-specific 
conditions (in particular accumulation 
of human capital, new start-up firms, 
innovation-oriented sectors, synergies 
between firms, and disposable venture 
capital), a favourable market situa-
tion2, and the existence of correspond-
ing actors and networks.3 Additionally, 
sufficient regional boundary condi-
tions are required, such as a local in-
frastructure, the ability of local actors 
to found new companies, the availabil-
ity of services and the existence of 
relevant public education and research 
institutions (cf. Blind/Grupp 1999, 
Brenner/Fornahl 2002). 
As the success of regional innovative 
networks and clusters crucially de-
                                                       
2 "Ein neuer lokaler branchenspezifischer 
Cluster entsteht in der Regel, während der 
Markt für die Produkte der Branche stark 
anwächst... Darüber hinaus kann eine Clu-
sterbildung durch eine Öffnung des Mark-
tes hervorgerufen werden." (Brenner/For-
nahl 2002:27) 
3 Regional entrepreneurship and networks 
play an important role as promoters con-
cerning initiation and success of coopera-
tion and coordination processes during the 
development phase of a local sector-
specific cluster by acting as germ cell and 
example for other actors and getting them 
to cooperate. (Brenner/Fornahl 2002:28) 
Jobst Conrad: Promoting technical innovations 69 
 
pends on the interaction dynamics of 
relevant influencing factors, its path-
way and modality should be investi-
gated, conceptualised and modelled. 
However, corresponding attempts are 
hardly found in social science research 
and literature, e.g. on regional innova-
tion networks. 
Concerning the possibilities and limi-
tations of a promotion policy striving 
for the formation of self-supporting 
regional innovation networks and 
clusters, the following conclusions 
seem to be justified according to Bren-
ner/Fornahl (2002) 
(1) Public policy can stimulate and 
promote the formation of (regional 
innovative) clusters, but cannot gener-
ate them itself. To enlarge the prob-
ability of their formation mainly meas-
ures to improve the (regional) infra-
structure appear to be appropriate, e.g. 
• the establishment or improvement 
of (continued) educational institu-
tions; 
• the support or improvement of the 
framework conditions for setting up 
new companies; 
• the establishment of research insti-
tutions or direct support of innova-
tion processes; 
• the improvement of (regional) in-
frastructure for companies. 
These measures should be executed in 
accordance with regional and sectoral 
objectives. In most cases the effective 
application of policy measures is only 
feasible at certain points in time in 
certain places. Therefore promotion 
policy should be limited in time until a 
cluster formed in less than a decade, 
and should take into account the sys-
tematically limited number of (possi-
bly) successful regions as geographical 
locations of regional innovation net-
works and local sector-specific clus-
ters. 
(2) Promotion policy may influence the 
sites as well as the strength of a clus-
ter. However, policy-making has only 
limited steering know-how due to in-
formation deficits and high transaction 
costs (cf. Keck 1987).  
As a result, the probability of success-
ful policy measures increases if politics 
does not intervene as an external au-
thority, and if it develops, instead, co-
ordination processes and problem 
solving capabilities together with the 
regional actors concerned in order to 
adapt them to regional and sector-
specific characteristics. 
Not every measure must be executed at 
the same policy level; instead various 
political actors may intervene – in a 
supplementary manner – with different 
measures at the same time. This re-
quires close cooperation and coordi-
nation between the participating policy 
levels. Since regional actors may react 
differently to promotion policy, addi-
tional pick-up effects (Mitnahmeef-
fekte) have to be avoided as far as pos-
sible by appropriate organisation of 
promotion measures. 
(3) Concerning the four preconditions 
of cluster formation described above, 
improving regional boundary condi-
tions constitutes the best possibility 
for promotion policy to have signifi-
cant effects.  
In said conditions, apart from the sup-
port of innovation processes the most 
effective measures are the ones to 
educate labour force and to create 
sector-specific infrastructure. A further 
measure is to support the foundation 
of companies immediately after the 
formation of a new market. Promotion 
policy has much less chances to influ-
ence sector-specific self-reinforcing 
processes, at least as long as the state 
is not able to act itself as buyer. Simi-
larly, the foundation of regional firms 
can only be supported by indirect 
measures aiming at regional commu-
nication and diffusion processes. Fur-
thermore, attitudes and opinion of the 
population mainly depend on cultural 
aspects and on structures having al-
ready developed in the past so that 
policy can influence them weakly at 
best. 
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On the one hand, promoting innova-
tive (regional) clusters is politically 
attractive, because a major result can 
be achieved with relatively small ef-
forts if the preconditions of cluster 
formation described above are given, 
because promotion policy can be lim-
ited in time for good reasons, and be-
cause it can expect additional indirect 
positive effects on competitive and 
innovative capabilities and regional 
development in general. 
On the other hand, a promotion policy 
aiming at connecting global innova-
tions with regional competencies is in 
conflict with a regional policy aiming 
at equal living conditions and stan-
dards, as the former sharpens interre-
gional gradients by the successful de-
velopment of promoted regions. 
 
 
2 Development of InnoPlanta 
Like most of the rural areas of the 
eastern German states, the region 
Nordharz/Börde, situated between 
Magdeburg and Quedlinburg, can be 
characterised by low economic 
strength and dynamics and high rates 
of unemployment. It has at its dis-
posal, however, a long and continuous 
tradition and expertise in the field of 
special cultures, cultivating spice and 
herbal plants, and seed cultivation, 
supported by respective favourable 
climatic conditions. This is important 
because internationally competitive 
plant breeding is the bottleneck of the 
economic implementation of the po-
tentials of plant genetics (Voß et al. 
2002). 
In the late 1990s regional efforts were 
started to improve in a medium-term 
perspective the economic power of the 
state of Sachsen-Anhalt by goal-
oriented support and coordination of 
InnoPlanta 
Nordharz/Börde 
Gatersleben 
Geschäftsstelle 
Prof. Hellriegel 
Institut e. V. 
Bernburg 
1 project 
Akzeptanz 
UFZ Leipzig-Halle 
GmbH 
BBJ Consult AG 
Halle 
 
BiRo GbR 
Sommerschenburg 
1 project 
Dr. Junghans 
GmbH 
Groß Schierstedt 
2 projects 
BAZ Quedlinburg  
7 projects 
 
Nordsaat Saatzucht 
GmbH Böhnshausen 
3 projects 
PR Arbeit 
Bio Mit-
teldeutschland 
GmbH  
Gatersleben 
LWPG 
Schackstedt 
 
MAWEA 
Aschers-
leben 
GmbH 
1 project 
Saatzucht 
Aschers-
leben 
2 projects 
LW Haus-
mann 
Aschersleben 
MLU Halle  
1 project 
Groetzner 
Saatzucht 
GmbH 
Salzmünde 
3 projects 
TINPLANT 
GmbH  
Klein Wan-
zleben  
1 project 
Bildung GfW  
Aschersleben- 
Staßfurt mbH 
Hochschule Anhalt 
(FH) Bernburg  
3 projects 
Sungene GmbH 
Gatersleben 
1 project 
METOP GmbH  
Magdeburg 
Saatzucht  
Möringen  
GmbH & Co. KG  
1 project 
Humboldt 
Universität 
Berlin 
1 project 
ÖHMI AG 
Magdeburg 
PPM Magde-
burg e.V.  
1 project 
Icon Genetics 
GmbH Halle  
1 project 
Gerbstedter 
Agrar-
genossen-
schaft e.G. 
1 project 
LLG Bernburg  
1 project 
Saatzucht Had-
mersleben GmbH 
2 projects 
IPK Gatersleben 
7 projects 
TraitGenetics 
GmbH 
Gatersleben 
1 project 
Zuckerfabrik 
Kleinwanzle-
FR Strube 
Saatzucht KG 
NL Schlan-
stedt  
2 projects 
Mycosym Envi- 
ronment GmbH 
Bitterfeld  
1 project 
Figure 1:  Cooperative networking of project partners within InnoPlanta 
Source: InnoPlanta secretariat 
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research, development and the open-
ing up of new markets in the field of 
new biotechnologies on the basis of 
these regional traditions and compe-
tencies. These regional efforts met 
with the InnoRegio program of the 
federal ministry for education, re-
search and technology (BMBF), a pro-
gram for supporting – on a competitive 
basis – the self-organisation of re-
gional innovation networks in the 
eastern German states. It was based 
on the intention to advance economi-
cally promising research and develop-
ment in cooperative arrangements of 
local industrial companies and re-
search institutes by providing corre-
sponding seed money in the InnoRegio 
program of altogether 255 Mio. € over 
a period of five years (BMBF 2000). 
The InnoPlanta association, newly 
founded in 2000, initiating, organising 
and administrating corresponding re-
gional research efforts and networks 
of its members in plant biotechnology, 
became winner of that InnoRegio 
competition and received about 20 
Mio. € between 2001 and 2006. 
The cooperating actors from science 
and industry, participating in approxi-
mately 30 funded plant biotechnology 
R&D projects, mainly organised them-
selves as a regional innovation net-
work in order to receive public funding 
for their research interests, and there-
fore considered themselves reasonably 
as a kind of pork barrel. Figure 1 
represents the corresponding institu-
tions involved in the InnoRegio Inno-
Planta, including the number of R&D 
projects pursued, and indicates coop-
erative arrangements between them in 
2003 by lines connecting cooperating 
actors. Typically substantive intense 
communication among the cooperat-
ing partners is mainly taking place at 
the level of the different specific re-
search projects. Apart from the neces-
sary scientific-technological break-
throughs their chances for success 
crucially depend on associated com-
petitive advantages at the global level, 
on the economic power and position 
of the participating enterprises, and on 
the medium-term implementation of 
green biotechnology in Europe. At pre-
sent the latter is only realised to a very 
limited degree because of lacking ac-
ceptance by consumers (cf. Gaskell et 
al. 2003, Hampel 2004) and, until re-
cently, by a de-facto moratorium of 
genetically modified food and partly 
field tests of genetically modified 
plants at the EU level. 
Significantly, none of the R&D projects 
of InnoPlanta aims at developing any 
genetically modified food products, 
though mainly because of the then 
necessary huge development costs. 
Instead, they focus on new molecular 
genetic processes for plant breeding, 
on breeding of new resistances against 
important European pests in the major 
crop plants, on breeding of cultivated 
plants containing new components, 
and on the breeding optimisation of 
regionally important special cultures. 
In general, the ongoing R&D projects 
either aim with a strong scientific ori-
entation at the development of innova-
tive biotechnological processes, or at 
niche markets by improving spice and 
herbal plants and regionally important 
cultivated plants with the help of plant 
biotechnological products and proc-
esses. Project costs vary between 
260.000 € and nearly 5 Mio €. Subse-
quent market penetration of successful 
R&D projects typically can be expected 
10 or more years after their beginning 
(Conrad/Steuer 2003). 
During the first years (2000 – 2002) the 
learning process of major science-
based network actors, especially of the 
centrally positioned plant biotechnol-
ogy research institute IPK Gatersleben 
(Institut für Pflanzengenetik und Kul-
turpflanzenforschung), to (re)orient 
their publicly BMBF-funded R&D pro-
jects from basic research in biotech-
nology to market-oriented R&D pro-
jects with genuine participation of lo-
cal industrial companies contributing 
their own financial means, too, turned 
out to be troublesome and painstak-
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ing. The reason for this was the trade-
off between their genuine scientific 
research interests and the pressure of 
the funding ministry and its associated 
research project management body 
Jülich, which is responsible for final 
funding decisions and project control, 
towards marketable development 
products. Nevertheless, the largely 
BMBF-funded InnoPlanta project 
scheme helps to initiate and to push 
regional contacts and possible future 
cooperative market-oriented R&D pro-
jects of scientific and economic actors. 
Figures 2a and 2b give a condensed 
overview over the (prospective) devel-
opment process of InnoPlanta over 
time for the past (1997-2004) and for 
the future (2004-2020), assuming its 
economic success. The figures indicate 
the interaction dynamics of key devel-
opment determinants at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-level. 
At the micro-level, over time the devel-
opment of InnoPlanta as an innovation 
network is pointed out as resulting 
from its internal development dynam-
ics; at the meso-level, the major re-
gional political and economic actors 
and boundary conditions can be ob-
served; and, finally, at the macro-level, 
the general (national and global) policy 
programs, conflicts and regulatory 
arrangements as well as key develop-
ments and market structures in plant 
biotechnology are listed. As indicated 
by the positioning of corresponding 
boxes in figures 2a and 2b, InnoPlanta 
and its members and additional rele-
vant actors form the essential actor 
constellation which decides on and is 
responsible for project performance, 
follow-up developments and founding 
of biotech-start-ups. 
Up till now, four phases of Inno-
Planta's development – described in 
more detail in Conrad (2005) – may be 
distinguished: rise and foundation 
(1999-2000), establishment and forma-
tion of the structure (2001-02), con-
solidation and routinization (2002-04), 
and optimisation and continuation 
(2004-06). Obviously, policy influence 
only plays an limited role, effective 
mainly in the beginning of network 
development. Currently, the sketched 
development process of InnoPlanta is 
somewhat below the top of figure 2b. 
After the InnoRegio program ended 
end of 2006 InnoPlanta continues to 
acquire and perform plant biotechnol-
ogy R&D projects, though at a lower 
level of funding and still without sig-
nificant income from selling its own 
genuine products on the market.4 
 
3 General framework conditions 
Four main general framework condi-
tions which are specified below, de-
termine the range of InnoPlanta's pos-
sible development paths and innova-
tion success:  
• the general conditions of success 
for regional innovation networks 
and clusters; 
• the innovation dynamics of plant 
biotechnology at the global level; 
• the biotechnology policy and regu-
lation, as well as low social accep-
tance of genetically modified food 
in Germany; 
• the BMBF-InnoRegio program for 
the eastern German states and the 
regional biotechnology policy in 
Sachsen-Anhalt. 
Cluster formation depends on appro-
priate sector-specific conditions, a 
favourable market situation, the exis-
tence of corresponding actors and 
networks, and sufficient regional 
boundary conditions (cf. Bren-
ner/Fornahl 2002). At the level of ac-
tors, successful development of inno-
vative networks requires a common 
objective, appropriate forms of organi-
sation and communication, the neces-
sary performance capability of partici-
pating actors, the existence of com-
plementary competencies, and the 
                                                       
4 This article was mainly written in 2005/06, 
and revised early in 2007. 
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    Macro  Meso  Micro  Meso          Macro  
politics/society                      state/region          InnoPlanta         actors in context      economy/world 
k
structure, goal and 
strategy formation, 
formulation and 
selection of pro-
jects  
general pro-
motion of BT, 
further promo-
tion in the 
future 
promotion of 
plant BT by 
GfW 
promoters, wan-
ting to distin-
guish themselves 
legal regu- 
lation of BT 
InnoPlan-
ta: foun-
dation 
poor econo-
mic situation 
expansion 
and market 
penetration 
of new BT 
global players  
of agrochemis-
try and food 
industry 
participation of 
scientific and 
economic ac-
tors, key actors:  
IPK, BAZ 
majority refusal 
of genfood, de-
bate on gene 
technology 
BT-offensive 
of state go-
vernment 
regional 
infrastructure 
project man-
agement body: 
granting and 
monitoring 
projects 
favourable 
regional 
embedding 
NW formation, 
NW manage-
ment, learning 
processes, con-
flict management 
growth of 
green BT,  first 
generation of 
transgenic 
plants, primar-
ily feed and 
ingredients  
NW resources, 
self-funding, 
venture capital  
carrying out pro-
jects, quality of 
promotion policy 
actor 
constellation 
market situati-
on, competing 
companies 
GM-free food, 
economic 
power rela-
tions 
technology policy, 
InnoRegio promo-
tion 
NW positioning 
Figure 2a: Model type development dynamics of InnoPlanta (past) 
BT=biotechnology, NW=network, GfW=Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung 
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          Macro                 Meso    Micro         Meso             Macro  
politics/society        state/region                   InnoPlanta             actors in context      economy/world market 
demand for 
products of 
plant BT 
successful  
NW actors, self-
positioning 
changing 
regulatory 
patterns 
centre for plant BT, 
1. and 2. generation 
of transgenic plants, 
industrial raw mate-
rials 
NW stabilisation,  
entering the 
market, com-
petitiveness 
first of all lim-
ited market 
growth of the 2. 
and 3. genera-
tion of trans-
genic plants 
integration in 
the product 
value chain 
good project re-
sults, field trials, 
follow-up projects, 
cultivation 
innovation, 
self dynamics 
cooperation of 
NW structure, 
NW culture,  
NW objectives in 
NW processes 
global Players  
of agrochemis-
try and food 
industry 
EU-USA trade 
conflicts about 
gene technol-
local protest 
against gene 
technology 
founding of bio-
tech-start-ups, 
education pro-
grams in BT 
cooperation 
agreements 
NW positioning 
Figure 2b: Model type development dynamics of InnoPlanta (future) 
BT=biotechnology, NW=network, 
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capacity to bring them into innovative 
projects (Eickelpasch et al. 2002). 
These conditions meanwhile can be 
seen as fulfilled to quite some degree 
in the case of InnoPlanta. 
The expected mid- and long-term 
commercial potentials of agrobiotech-
nology are considered multifarious in 
spite of current low acceptance of 
many products (Menrad et al. 1999). 
Different areas of applying plant ge-
netic engineering have to be distin-
guished (cf. Voß et al. 2002), such as 
improvement of agronomic properties, 
food-oriented utilization or industrial 
raw materials. Growth rates and prof-
itability of GM (genetically manipu-
lated)-based output properties and 
even more of molecular farming are 
considered much higher than the ones 
of GM-based input properties5, and 
already for 2010 their market potential 
is optimistically estimated fivefold the 
latter one (cf. Kern 2002, Vogel/Potthof 
2003). So, in principle, the application 
possibilities and perspectives of plant 
biotechnology can be judged as mani-
fold and positive. Whereas many 
mainly diagnostic and technical meth-
ods of breeding using gene technology 
are already well established, the mani-
fold and broadly utilized creation and 
diffusion of transgenic plants, how-
ever, remain questionable for the fore-
seeable future because of economic, 
technical and biological reasons (Vo-
gel/Potthof 2003). 
The development of transgenic plants 
lasts 6 to 12 years. The chance of mar-
ket introduction of a successful labo-
ratory development is less than 1%. 
                                                       
5 GM-based input properties stem from 
intentional changes of plants in one or two 
genes in order to influence their cultivation 
and yield, i.e. their agronomic properties, 
but not the quality of the final product 
itself. GM-based output properties refer to 
intentional changes of existing metabolic 
processes or to the addition of new meta-
bolic processes by changing or adding 
several plant genes in order to change food 
properties. Molecular farming aims at util-
izing plants for producing non-plant prod-
ucts such as pharmaceuticals or vaccines. 
Development costs amount to about 
50 Mio. €. Without large markets al-
lowing rapid return on investment 
these development costs and addi-
tional costs of separate harvest and 
identity preservation are too high. 
However, the demand of these trans-
genic plants frequently is not secured, 
particularly as long as the food indus-
try pursues a strategy of GM-free food. 
Furthermore, the insertion of several 
alien genes and their tissue- and 
stage-specific exprimation with the 
help of specific promoters is a difficult, 
technical enterprise prone to failure, 
since the intervention into complex 
and well balanced metabolic processes 
easily leads to unwanted side effects. 
Therefore the input properties of her-
bicide tolerance and insect resistance 
in few relatively easily transformable 
cultivated plants, i.e. soy bean, corn, 
canola and cotton dominate the mar-
ket of transgenic plants. Plants with 
GM-based output properties were 
hardly licensed and offered on the 
world market in 2003, but may have a 
larger share after 2010. 
In sum, commercial cultivation of 
transgenic plants with these new input 
properties has rapidly expanded to 102 
million hectares in 2005 after its start 
in 1996, though concentrated in few 
countries: USA, Argentina, Canada, and 
meanwhile Brazil, India, China, too. 
However, diffusion of the second gen-
eration of transgenic plants with GM-
based output properties should be 
expected only gradually and to a lim-
ited extent, involving a higher risk of 
(economic) failure. So the innovation 
dynamics of plant biotechnology at the 
global level tends to be a potentially 
highly favourable, but still relatively 
uncertain contextual framework condi-
tion for InnoPlanta. 
Whereas red biotechnology meanwhile 
is socially more or less accepted and 
used in Germany – with the exception 
of genetic manipulation and utilization 
of human beings themselves –, the 
utilization and regulation of green bio-
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technology are pushed by the actors 
involved in its development, on the 
one hand, but are confronted with 
severe restrictions in Europe, on the 
other hand. These restrictions mainly 
stem from the combination of the fol-
lowing circumstances. The release of 
GM-plants and the import of geneti-
cally modified food in fact were largely 
prohibited because of the de facto EU-
moratorium 1998-2004, resulting from 
strong political controversies in the 
mid 1990s. Additionally, food and feed 
containing at least 0,9% of substances, 
which are changed or produced by 
genetic engineering, have to be la-
belled correspondingly since 2004. 
Furthermore, consumers can bring to 
bear their scepticism or non-
acceptance of genetically modified 
food in particular, in an economically 
effective manner. Since the late 1990s 
food producers, trade and retailers in 
the EU pursued corporate strategies to 
produce and offer only (certified) GM-
free food and thus contributed to 
blocking green biotechnology in the 
food sector up to the present. 
In view of its multifarious potentials, 
its forced utilization in increasing parts 
of the world, and the vested interests 
of its promoters in agrochemistry and 
parts of agriculture, an ongoing longer 
term hindrance of green biotechnology 
seems unlikely, as long as no grave 
accident attributed to gene technology 
occurs. It will also remain unlikely as 
long as trade-conflicts and costly la-
belling and separation prescriptions do 
not make GM-food and -feed eco-
nomically unviable (cf. Bernauer 2003, 
Paarlberg 2003, Young 2001). Thus, 
biotechnology policies and regula-
tions, and lacking social demand for 
genetically modified food tend to 
partly delay plant biotechnology devel-
opment processes and to restrict them 
to non-food properties and products, 
but do not prevent them per se. This is 
well reflected in the plant technology 
development path followed by Inno-
Planta. 
Finally, as shown in sections 6 and 7, 
public promotion and funding of 
(green) biotechnology by the InnoRe-
gio program of the BMBF (see cf. 
Scholl/Wurzel 2002) and by the bio-
technology promotion policy of Sach-
sen-Anhalt's government, too, were 
and are (necessary though not suffi-
cient) key preconditions for the estab-
lishment and development of the re-
gional innovation network InnoPlanta 
(cf. Conrad 2005). 
 
4 Actor constellation and hetero-
geneous pattern of interests of 
the network 
At the level of mainly corporate actors 
the actor constellation of the Inno-
Planta network distinguishes itself by a 
clear involvement in the region, con-
tinuing engagement of its promoters, 
membership of interested service 
agencies, banks and public administra-
tion, support by (promoting) political 
institutions, cautious support by agri-
cultural organisations, largely absence 
of opponents such as critics of gene 
technology, but also of global players 
in the agricultural, food and biotech-
nology industry. 
At the individual level the actor con-
stellation is mainly formed by an inner 
circle of 10 to 15 persons who occupy 
key positions in their respective (scien-
tific, economic or political) institu-
tions. As a community with a common 
purpose they attempt to get their vary-
ing interests and concerns taken into 
account with the help of InnoPlanta's 
development and orientation. Said 
interests consist of the acquisition of 
research funds, the profiling in eco-
nomic policy, the establishment of 
educational infrastructure and study 
courses and finally strengthening one's 
position. Due to their professional 
positions and since they belong to the 
inner circle their (project) interests are 
more likely regarded than the ones of 
other members of the network who are 
less involved. For instance, the two key 
research institutions IPK Gatersleben 
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and BAZ (Bundesanstalt für Züch-
tungsforschung an Kulturpflanzen) in 
Quedlinburg (together) participate in 
more than half of all projects and re-
ceive about one third of all InnoPlanta 
research funds (Conrad 2005, Con-
rad/Steuer 2003). 
Since the interests of the major (cor-
porate) members of the network are 
mostly in line with each other (funding 
of, performing and economic viability 
of R&D plant biotechnology projects), 
they are rather compatible with the 
genuine interest of the network to suc-
cessfully carry out such projects. Co-
operation between different (research) 
fields and linking of differing R&D pro-
jects, however, received and still re-
ceive less support from the network 
members. 
Manifest and latent conflict constella-
tions mainly stem from procedural and 
(via bargaining) regulated conflicts 
about the distribution of resources and 
of corresponding decision competen-
cies. The (above mentioned) structur-
ally embedded conflict about research 
priorities led to acceptable solutions, 
too. In this context the small Inno-
Planta secretariat provided an admin-
istrative forum for diverse networking 
activities, mainly to organise informa-
tion flows and knowledge exchange, 
communication among network mem-
bers, and project proposal procedures, 
to advise project proponents, to attract 
and convince new members, and to do 
public relations. 
There is no opposition to and contro-
versial internal debate about the utili-
zation of genetic engineering in plant 
biotechnology within the network, 
although varying positions exist con-
cerning emphasizing and focussing on 
it. In view of the in general disfavour-
able socio-economic situation of Sach-
sen-Anhalt the aim of and the belief in 
a future regional centre of plant bio-
technology may well be helpful for the 
sustaining power and (economic) vi-
ability of InnoPlanta. 
 
5 Innovation pattern and market 
perspectives of InnoPlanta re-
search projects 
The innovations in plant biotechnology 
by InnoPlanta members are frequently 
oriented towards niche markets con-
cerning specific spice and herbal 
plants with well established regional 
expertise, since they take into account 
world market perspectives, and re-
nounce the development of genetically 
modified food products.  
The approximately 30 research pro-
jects, currently carried out by collabo-
rative research groups from biotech-
nology science and industry, consid-
erably differ with respect to the influ-
encing factors such as project size, 
type of innovation strived for, market 
potential and market chances, GM 
product envisaged or not, economic 
consequences and social compatibility, 
or problems of social acceptance.6 As a 
consequence, these projects have to be 
investigated individually, and their 
chances of success or failure vary 
enormously. 
Addressing in somewhat more detail 
(typical) R&D processes, orientations 
and market perspectives of these re-
search projects, the outlet and differ-
entiation of InnoPlanta's innovation 
strategies may be summed up as fol-
lows: 
(1) Referring to future use and selling 
of project results, relevant framework 
conditions as well as the perspectives 
of the collaborators are clearly ori-
ented towards the world market. This 
may concern potential future markets 
of Mykorrhiza granulates or competi-
tiveness of thyme products on the 
home market against cheap import 
goods. Furthermore, with respect to 
research, development and patenting, 
                                                       
6 Sufficient understanding and assessment 
of the research projects requires rather 
detailed knowledge of their substance, 
design, development, actor perspectives 
and constellation, and structural contexts 
(cf. Conrad 2005). 
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the actors involved in the R&D projects 
know about similar projects and their 
differences all over the world. 
(2) Due to the mainly small or eventu-
ally medium size of the regional com-
panies involved, most R&D projects at 
least first aim at niche markets which 
are less attractive for large agrochemi-
cal or food corporations and allow for 
competitive advantages of specialised 
development competencies. Some R&D 
projects, however, aim at the devel-
opment of basic platform technologies, 
such as Transgene Operating Systems 
of the biotech start-up Icon Genetics, 
which could be applied in plant breed-
ing worldwide though typically in co-
operation agreements with large bio-
technology corporations. The biotech-
nological processes and products en-
visaged in the R&D projects of Inno-
Planta are much less afflicted by global 
market conditions, trade conflicts and 
opposing interests (cf. Bernauer 2003, 
Kern 2002) than the production of ge-
netically modified soybeans, rape, cot-
ton and maize predominating in agro-
biotechnology at present. 
(3) The members of InnoPlanta took 
into account the currently disfavour-
able boundary conditions of green 
biotechnology, such as partly restric-
tive policy regulations, lacking accep-
tance of genfood by consumers, re-
nunciation of genfood by most food 
corporations. Although nearly all 
members of InnoPlanta are in favour 
of green biotechnology they deliber-
ately forwent to carrying out R&D pro-
ject aiming at genfood products.  
(4) There exist partly diverging inter-
ests and aims of the actors belonging 
or intentionally influencing the Inno-
Planta network, such as basic research 
orientation versus market orientation, 
flexible research arrangements versus 
bureaucratic control schemes, differing 
time horizons of research, develop-
ment and testing of new plant breeds, 
of market introduction and penetra-
tion, and of visible impacts of (tech-
nology) policy-making. Thus, the in-
tended strengthening of regional eco-
nomic performance by the market 
penetration of newly developed plant 
biotechnology products or processes 
will most probably demand more time 
than required under ideal model net-
work conditions. 
The InnoPlanta R&D projects show 
considerable differences in several 
dimensions (cf. Conrad/Steuer 2003). 
Success and failure are both well pos-
sible and depend on the respective 
specific boundary conditions of the 
projects. Whereas the majority of the 
projects involves incremental innova-
tions, particularly those focussing on 
new molecular genetic processes aim 
at radical or at least moderate innova-
tions and at greater market potentials. 
Additionally, economic considerations 
do play a significant role in the pro-
jects, yet address differing aspects. In 
one case they led to the stop of a large 
project. 
GM technologies are in the centre of 
some projects and avoided in other 
projects. Whereas most projects would 
lead to a competitive advantage of the 
plant biotechnology products or proc-
esses under development, their techni-
cal viability and thus their successful 
development cannot be taken for 
granted at all. 
Consequently, innovation pattern and 
market perspectives of the InnoPlanta 
research projects may be summed up 
as follows: 
• Most R&D projects will probably 
not reach the phase of successful 
market introduction. However, 
some of them will succeed in mar-
ket penetration, most likely those 
addressing smaller market seg-
ments of spice or herbal plants, 
which usually are less interesting 
for large (multinational) corpora-
tions. 
• Differentiation in innovation strat-
egy (cf. Porter 1990, 1998) seems to 
be particularly advantageous for a 
regional research network lacking 
the market power of large transna-
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tional corporations as influential 
global players. 
• Induced by the innovative efforts of 
the network quite some improve-
ment of the regional scientific, 
technical and economic infrastruc-
ture and framework conditions may 
well be reached with competent ac-
tors and networks for further eco-
nomically viable activities in plant 
biotechnology. This would contrib-
ute to the socioeconomic viability 
of the region Nordharz/Börde, 
which offers rather low attractive-
ness compared to other regions of 
Germany, but has a long tradition 
in agriculture and plant breeding, 
on the one hand, and to environ-
mentally friendly changes in agri-
cultural and food production in 
some cases, on the other hand 
(Conrad 2003). It remains an open 
question if this would be sufficient 
to more or less generally secure its 
sustainability in economic, social 
and cultural terms. 
• The reach of the innovations, par-
ticularly those promising ones ad-
dressing spice and herbal plants 
and their products, will remain a 
relatively limited one on average. 
Therefore future innovations (in 
plant biotechnology) may well be 
facilitated by this InnoRegio setting, 
but their substantial sustainability 
remains uncertain due to unpre-
dictable changing framework con-
ditions for research and develop-
ment in a future more than 10 years 
ahead. 
 
6 Structure and role of public 
promotion policy  
Public promotion policy played and 
plays a decisive role in the formation 
and the development of the regional 
innovation network InnoPlanta. With-
out the (competition-based) InnoRegio 
program it would hardly exist, al-
though its initiators possibly might 
have created a similar (smaller) asso-
ciation with start-up financing pro-
vided by the state government of Sach-
sen-Anhalt. Public support and funds 
(of 20 Mio. €) thus were a necessary 
condition for the stable formation and 
possible future self-supporting devel-
opment of InnoPlanta. 
The same is true for further (foresee-
able) programs and measures such as 
the recognition of InnoPlanta as a 
competence network in biotechnology 
by the BMBF or the participation of 
InnoPlanta members in the biotech-
nology program of the state govern-
ment of Sachsen-Anhalt, started in 
2004 and providing 150 Mio. € over a 
period of five years. With this program 
it attempts to make the state a centre 
not only for red biotechnology, but for 
green biotechnology, too, in order to 
strengthen its economic development. 
In view of the projects which are typi-
cally profitable only in the long run, 
these promotion programs provide 
windows of opportunity for Inno-
Planta. They offer the chance to ac-
quire funds beyond the InnoRegio pro-
gram for promising, partly already 
running R&D projects with the aim to 
develop marketable products or proc-
esses in plant biotechnology. 
The options and measures of public 
policy to establish innovative regional 
self-supporting clusters – in the field of 
plant biotechnology – are limited and 
mainly concern the support of suitable 
regional boundary conditions and the 
provision of appropriate regulatory 
and communicative framework condi-
tions (cf. Bröcker et al. 2003). Corre-
sponding public policy measures exist 
to a considerable degree in the case of 
InnoPlanta. However, they can only 
enable but not enforce the formation 
of such a cluster because both, sup-
porting as well as restraining factors, 
influence its sector-related, market-
related, as well as regional socio-
structural, socio-cultural and infra-
structural preconditions. Accumulation 
of human capital, founding of new 
firms, significant competitive advan-
tages by innovations, synergies by co-
operation, venture capital by active 
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local firms are favourable sector-
related preconditions. An expanding 
market for the products of the sector 
usually is a necessary market-related 
precondition for cluster formation 
(Brenner/Fornahl 2002). 
Necessary regional preconditions, such 
as the existence of educational institu-
tions, favourable attitude and possibil-
ity of local actors to found new com-
panies, innovative capability of re-
search institutions and of the popula-
tion, have already been mentioned in 
section 1. Related factors in the case of 
InnoPlanta are the agrochemistry and 
the seed industry, which are highly 
concentrated at the global level, as 
well as the growth perspectives of 
plant biotechnology, which vary largely 
according to product groups. Addition-
ally the political controversy about 
green biotechnology has to be men-
tioned, as well as the economic and 
social conditions at the national and 
regional level, which are currently un-
favourable. Finally the innovation ori-
entation of key regional actors and 
their capability to cooperate and to 
regulate conflicts, plays a major role. 
After all even the insufficient infra-
structure and the low attractiveness of 
the region has to be mentioned. 
The partly coincidental concurrence of 
four main policy objectives and pro-
grams were crucial for the favourable 
situation with respect to public promo-
tion policy in 2000: 
• Already since the 1970s technology 
policy in Germany classified bio-
technology as key technology for 
Germany's economic competitive-
ness, leading to corresponding bio-
technology promotion programs 
with continuously rising funding 
budgets. 
• Since the 1990s technology, inno-
vation, economic and regional poli-
cies increasingly aim at and support 
– by rather complex policy pro-
grams – the development of re-
gional innovation networks and 
clusters which shall thereby gain a 
self-supporting innovation dynam-
ics and thus economic competitive-
ness and attractiveness. 
• Also since the 1990s diverse pro-
motion policy programs and finan-
cial transfers are pursued to rebuild 
deficient infrastructure and com-
petitiveness of a declined economy 
and science in the eastern German 
states. The InnoRegio program, de-
veloped in this context, combines 
the promotion of these reconstruc-
tion efforts with an innovation pol-
icy aiming at regional cluster for-
mation. 
• The biotechnology program of the 
state government of Sachsen-
Anhalt, started in 2003, has the 
same objective, but also reflects 
desperate measures and attempts 
at profiling to secure political le-
gitimacy in view of the desolate 
situation of state economy and 
public budgets. 
Concerning their substantive effective-
ness two features of these promotion 
policies remain doubtful. On the one 
hand there is a rather rigid emphasis 
particularly in the ideological framing 
on mere economic procedural and 
evaluative concerns regarding their 
implementation, reflecting currently 
prevailing policy orientation towards 
short-term market success to secure 
legitimacy. On the other hand there 
are contradictory objectives of regula-
tory and promotion policies in (plant) 
biotechnology, hardly avoidable in the 
context of political controversy over 
green gene technology. 
Summarizing, the substantive struc-
tural features of public promotion pol-
icy in the InnoRegio program con-
sisted and still consists of a competi-
tion for R&D funds, initiating regional 
network formation, and the distribu-
tion of funds for R&D projects based 
on research cooperation over a period 
of six years. The selection of project 
proposals took place in a multi-step 
process by the network board itself, by 
a mixed promotion management team, 
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consisting of representatives from the 
network, the research management 
body Jülich, and state officials, and – 
as a veto power – the research man-
agement body and the funding minis-
try. 
Although the InnoRegio program 
ended in 2006, further promotion pro-
grams of the BMBF are likely and also 
justified in view of the only long-term 
achievable profitability of most plant 
biotechnology R&D projects pursued. 
Referring to the necessary positive 
interaction dynamics of favourable 
factors determining the success of the 
InnoRegio program, it is based on the 
mutually adjusted utilisation of the 
following instruments: First of all the 
fixing and operationalisation of quality 
goals as well as competition, incen-
tives and agreements on objectives by 
the participants. Furthermore, meas-
ures are taken to realize the objectives 
from bottom-up, and monitoring ef-
forts to analyse development proc-
esses and the effects of measures 
taken (Müller et al. 2002: 134). 
Apart from a rather limited selectivity 
in project selection and, in the begin-
ning, administrative problems of pro-
gram implementation, leading to de-
laying and discouraging effects, public 
promotion policy clearly had a strongly 
promoting impact on the development 
of the regional innovation network 
InnoPlanta and thus largely fulfilled its 
political purpose and intention. 
The InnoRegio program was a complex 
extensive (and experimental) policy 
program of the BMBF. Furthermore, it 
combined within one ministry different 
policies addressing research, technol-
ogy, innovation, economic and re-
gional development, which are mostly 
pursued separately, and thus had a 
rather coherent character.7 However, 
these qualifications do not necessarily 
                                                       
7 In its starting phase it was – in financial 
terms – the most extensive promotion pro-
gram of innovation policy for the eastern 
German states (BMBF 2005: 19). 
hold for the coordination of different 
policies pursued at different (state, 
federal, EU) policy levels of promotion 
policy because corresponding coordi-
nation efforts are largely missing. 
 
7 Comparison of promotion ob-
jectives with achieved results 
When comparing policy promotion 
objectives with results actually 
achieved, three distinctions have to be 
made in order to arrive at clear-cut 
conclusions in that respect. First, the 
effects of the InnoRegio program as a 
whole on regional scientific and eco-
nomic development have to be distin-
guished from those on InnoPlanta and 
the region Nordharz/Börde, which are 
of interest here. Second, the achieve-
ment of short-, medium- and long-
term objectives of the program may 
well differ and the latter ones cannot 
yet be evaluated at present because 
they can only be observed in about the 
next decade. Third, various objectives, 
such as the cooperation of regional 
actors, the degree of networking, crea-
tion of regional identity via network-
ing, mobilisation of additional (eco-
nomic) development impulses, may be 
envisaged but may be achieved with 
differing success. 
The evaluation of these developments 
is based on a systematic (accompany-
ing) study of the effects of the InnoRe-
gio program (BMBF 2005) as well as 
on a detailed case study of Inno-
Planta's development, including the 
role of promotion policy (Conrad 
2005). The combination of both studies 
allows to give relatively clear-cut an-
swers to the question if and to which 
degree (federal) promotion policy 
achieved its objectives. Knowing that 
InnoPlanta is a rather positive example 
among all InnoRegios promoted, the 
general, partially cited qualifications in 
BMBF (2005) can be assumed to hold 
for InnoPlanta, too. 
The short-term objective of the In-
noRegio program is the establishment 
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of viable regional innovation networks, 
i.e. bringing together regional compe-
tencies for the common work on 
promising innovative projects. 
The medium-term objective is the im-
provement of the performance capacity 
of the network members so that inno-
vation processes are facilitated and 
their innovative capacity is enlarged, 
finally leading to an increase in their 
economic performance. 
The long-term objective is the streng-
thening of the regional economy as a 
whole so that the strengthening of 
actors, together with other direct or 
indirect effects of the InnoRegio pro-
gram leads to economic growth im-
pulses in the region (BMBF 2005). With 
growing length of time, the relative 
importance of promotion policy de-
creases compared to other influencing 
factors due to longer cause-effect-
chains. 
Improvement of scientific and eco-
nomic capability can rarely be attrib-
uted unequivocally to one specific vari-
able, such as a policy program or ac-
tivity. Likewise the success of any pol-
icy promoting innovation projects de-
pends on the fulfilment of precondi-
tions, such as a corresponding per-
formance potential of companies and 
realisable projects sustainable in the 
future. Taking these aspects into con-
sideration, the (possibly) observed 
correspondence of promotion objec-
tives and achieved results indicates a 
successful promotion policy, but does 
not actually prove it. 
With these caveats the following em-
pirical assertions can be made about 
the effects of the InnoRegio program 
on InnoPlanta and corresponding de-
velopment of the region Nordharz/ 
Börde: 
Short-term objectives 
Cooperation of different regional ac-
tors was successfully induced, al-
though InnoPlanta only very gradually 
was changing its character from a pork 
barrel into an innovation network, and 
cooperation mostly remained limited 
to specific projects with few participat-
ing actors, respectively. 
Medium-term objectives 
This cooperation tended to have posi-
tive effects on the innovation potential 
of the companies involved and also led 
to first successes in project-specific 
innovation processes. 
Long-term objectives 
Furthermore, intensified communica-
tion and exchange of services and ac-
tivities tended to induce positive eco-
nomic impulses for the region. Finally, 
the InnoRegio program induced a lim-
ited self-dynamics of the newly 
founded InnoPlanta association. This 
resulted in further mobilisation effects 
necessary to support its self-sufficient 
continuation after the end of the In-
noRegio program, which can be ob-
served at least in early 2007.8 So 
whereas technology and innovation 
policy induced the establishment of a 
regional innovative network in plant 
biotechnology, achieving subsequent 
successful cluster formation still re-
mains an open question for the future. 
However, this was no direct aim of the 
InnoRegio program.  
                                                       
8 For evaluating the effectivity of the In-
noRegio program key criterion is the dura-
bility of the processes of networked inno-
vative development induced by this pro-
gram. Here, the preliminary results are 
discrepant because the members of the 
various InnoRegios are sceptical about 
their chances to continue their R&D work 
after the end of its funding, on the one 
hand, but there is a general interest in 
most cases to further participate in the 
newly established network and to continue 
the cooperations initiated, on the other 
hand. In particular, the size of new product 
value chains generated can be reasonably 
assessed only if the results of the R&D 
projects will be successively transformed 
into new products so that product inputs 
will be increasingly demanded by enlarged 
production. In addition, establishing re-
gional product value chains by correspond-
ing innovation networks is limited by their 
objectives, actor interests and economic 
reasons (BMBF 2005: 8, 57, 71). 
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In sum, the short-term promotion ob-
jectives were reached to a considerable 
degree, and there are some indications 
that the medium-term promotion ob-
jectives may be at least partially 
reached as well. Whereas the efficacy 
of the InnoRegio program – after some 
likely initial difficulties9 – plausibly 
appears to be given for InnoPlanta and 
also in general, as confirmed by the 
perception of the InnoRegio partici-
pants (Eickelpasch 2004, BMBF 2005), 
its efficiency still cannot be judged 
because of lacking empirical criteria 
and comparable cases. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Putting together the insights gained 
from the case study and from the gen-
eral analysis of promotion policy the 
following conclusions can be drawn 
concerning successful promotion pol-
icy in the case investigated and in gen-
eral. 
(1) At the conceptual level, technology 
policy combined three objectives from 
the InnoRegio program: to promote 
industry-oriented and marketable 
technological trajectories in the east-
ern German states, to rely on regions 
as self-organising and self-supporting 
actor constellations for the develop-
ment of marketable key technologies, 
and to stimulate interregional compe-
tition for funding, technological pio-
neering and potential lead markets. 
(2) As with other technology promo-
tion programs, within the framework 
of the InnoRegio program technology 
policy can only provide favourable 
framework conditions and incentives, 
as well as initiate significant action 
and influence the basic development 
orientation of a regional innovation 
network. Its actual development, how-
                                                       
9 Frequently, the networks and their actors 
underestimated the task to transform their 
ideas in substantive R&D projects qualified 
for funding, and lacked experience con-
cerning public funding procedures and 
cooperation in networks (BMBF 2005:19). 
ever, apart from the public funding 
provided depends on the resources, 
the capacity for action and the self-
interests of a region, shaped by the 
availability and interests of (regional) 
promoters, overcoming problems of 
network formation, and resulting so-
cial and technological path dependen-
cies. So technology (promotion) policy 
– even if specified towards regional 
circumstances – has very limited pos-
sibilities to steer technical innovations. 
Once a project has been accepted for 
funding technology policy can hardly 
substantially influence its further de-
velopment and success. If a project or 
an InnoRegio finally will be economi-
cally successful is not within the reach 
of innovation policy. 
(3) Increasingly, technology policy is 
making an effort to evaluate its own 
programs by accompanying research. 
However, it remains an open question 
if the results of this research in fact 
influence actual and future policy pro-
grams accordingly. 
(4) Different from many other policy 
fields technology policy may follow 
necessary long-term perspectives al-
though the success of corresponding 
policy programs remains more open 
than those in other more short-term 
oriented policies. Because of the 
strong economic application and mar-
ket orientation of the InnoRegio pro-
gram, such a long-term perspective of 
one decade or even more may be easily 
undermined politically. 
It is worth noting that technology pol-
icy continued this promotional policy 
approach in later programs, such as 
"Interregional alliances for future mar-
kets (innovation fora)" or "Innovative 
regional growth centres".10 
Altogether, it is reasonable to conclude 
that technology promotion policy fully 
utilized its limited potentials with re-
spect to the self-defined objectives of 
                                                       
10 "Interregionale Allianzen für die Märkte 
von morgen (Innovationsforen)" and "Inno-
vative regionale Wachstumskerne". 
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the InnoRegio program. Apart from 
initial practical difficulties in particular 
for the InnoRegio InnoPlanta it real-
ized, its underlying conceptual ap-
proach in a well-reasoned manner. 
 
9 References 
Bernauer, Thomas, 2003: Genes, Trade, and 
Regulation. The Seeds of Conflict in 
Food Biotechnology. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press 
Blind, Knut, Grupp, Hariolf, 1999: Interde-
pendencies between the science and 
technology infrastructure and innova-
tion activities in German regions: em-
pirical findings and policy questions. In: 
Research Policy 28, 451-468 
BMBF (Bundesministeriumfür Bildung und 
Forschung) (ed.), 2000: InnoRegio - Die 
Dokumentation. Bonn: BMBF 
BMBF (Bundesministeriumfür Bildung und 
Forschung) (ed.), 2005: Das BMBF-
Förderprogramm InnoRegio - Ergebnis-
se der Begleitforschung. Bonn: BMBF 
Brenner, Thomas, Dirk Fornahl, 2002: Poli-
tische Möglichkeiten und Maßnahmen 
zur Erzeugung lokaler branchenspezifi-
scher Cluster. Report. Jena: Max-
Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von 
Wirtschaftssystemen 
Bröcker, Johannes, et al. (eds.), 2003: Inno-
vation Clusters and Interregional Com-
petition. Berlin: Springer 
Conrad, Jobst, 2003: Nachhaltigkeit grüner 
Gentechnik durch Konsistenz: Anforde-
rungen an und Restriktionen von Good 
Governance in einem regionalen Inno-
vationsverbund. In: Jutta Allmendinger 
(ed.), Entstaatlichung und Soziale Si-
cherheit (31. Deutscher Soziologentag). 
Teil 1. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 355-
374 
Conrad, Jobst, 2005: Grüne Gentechnik – 
Gestaltungschance und Entwicklungsri-
siko. Perspektiven eines regionalen In-
novationsnetzwerks. Wiesbaden: DUV 
Conrad, Jobst, Philipp Steuer, 2003: Be-
schreibung und Evaluation der Einzel-
projekte des InnoRegio-Vorhabens: In-
noPlanta Pflanzenbiotechnologie Nord-
harz/Börde. Report. Berlin/Leipzig 
Daele, Wolfgang van den, 1989: Kulturelle 
Bedingungen der Technikkontrolle 
durch regulative Politik. In: Peter Wein-
gart (ed.), Technik als sozialer Prozess. 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 197-230 
Eickelpasch, Alexander, 2004: Zur Zukunft 
der Geschäftsstellen - die Sicht der In-
noRegio-Teilnehmer. In: InnoRegio In-
foBrief 10, 1-2 
Eickelpasch, Alexander, et al., 2002: Das 
InnoRegio-Programm: Umsetzung und 
Entwicklung der Netzwerke. In: DIW-
Wochenbericht 21/2002: 329-338 
Gaskell, George, et al., 2003: Europeans 
and Biotechnology in 2002. Euro-
barometer 58.0. Report to the EU-
Commission. London  
Hampel, Jürgen, 2004: Die Akzeptanz gen-
technisch veränderter Lebensmittel in 
Europa. Stuttgarter Beiträge zur Risiko- 
und Nachhaltigkeitsforschung 3. Uni-
versität Stuttgart 
Keck, Otto, 1987: The information dilem-
ma: private information as a cause of 
transaction failure in markets, regulati-
on, hierarchy, and politics. In: Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 31: 139-163 
Kern, Manfred, 2002: Marktpotenziale 2010 
der Anwendungen im Bereich Landwirt-
schaft ("Grüne Gentechnik"). Ms. Frank-
furt 
Menrad, Klaus, et al., 1999: Future Impacts 
of Biotechnology on Agriculture, Food 
Production and Food Processing. Hei-
delberg: Physica 
Meyer-Krahmer, Frieder, 1999: Was bedeu-
tet Globalisierung für Aufgaben und 
hadlungsspielräume nationaler Innova-
tionspolitiken? In: Klaus Grimmer et al. 
(eds.), Innovationspolitik in globalisier-
ten Arenen. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 
43-73 
Müller, Bernhard, et al. (eds.), 2002: Kom-
munikation in regionalen Innovations-
netzwerken. München: Hampp 
Paarlberg, Robert L, 2003: Reinvigorating 
genetically modified crops. In: Issues in 
Science and Technology 19 (3): 86-92 
Porter, Michael E., 1990: The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations. London: MacMil-
lan Press 
Porter, Michael E., 1998: Clusters and the 
new economics of competition. In: Har-
vard Business Review (November-
December) 76 (6): 77-90 
Schimank, Uwe, 1991: Politische Steuerung 
in der Organisationsgesellschaft - am 
Beispiel der Forschungspolitik. In: 
Wolfgang Zapf (ed.), Die Modernisie-
rung moderner Gesellschaften (25. 
Deutscher Soziologentag). Frankfurt: 
Campus, 505-516 
Scholl, Wolfgang, Ulrich G. Wurzel, 2002: 
Erfolgsbedingungen regionaler Innova-
tionsnetzwerke - Ein organisationstheo-
retisches Kausalmodell. DIW-
Materialien 21/2002. Berlin 
Vogel, Benno, Christof Potthof, 2003: Ver-
schobene Marktreife. Materialien zur 
zweiten und dritten Generation trans-
gener Pflanzen. Bericht des Gen-
ethischen Netzwerks. Berlin 
Voß, Rainer, et al., 2002: Technikakzeptanz 
und Nachfragemuster als Standortvorteil 
im Bereich Pflanzengentechnik. Report. 
Wildau 
Jobst Conrad: Promoting technical innovations 85 
 
Young, Alasdair R., 2001: Trading Up or 
Trading Blows? US Politics and 
Transatlantic Trade in Genetically 
Modified Food. EUI Working Papers 
RSC 2001/30. Fiesole 
 
